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Abstract
Large-scale computational experiments, often running over weeks and over large datasets, are used extensively
in fields such as epidemiology, meteorology, computational biology, and healthcare to understand phenomena, and
design high-stakes policies affecting everyday health and economy. For instance, the OpenMalaria framework is a
computationally-intensive simulation used by various non-governmental and governmental agencies to understand
malarial disease spread and effectiveness of intervention strategies, and subsequently design healthcare policies.
Given that such shared results form the basis of inferences drawn, technological solutions designed, and day-to-
day policies drafted, it is essential that the computations are validated and trusted. In particular, in a multi-agent
environment involving several independent computing agents, a notion of trust in results generated by peers is critical
in facilitating transparency, accountability, and collaboration. Using a novel combination of distributed validation
of atomic computation blocks and a blockchain-based immutable audits mechanism, this work proposes a universal
framework for distributed trust in computations. In particular we address the scalaibility problem by reducing the
storage and communication costs using a lossy compression scheme. This framework guarantees not only verifiability
of final results, but also the validity of local computations, and its cost-benefit tradeoffs are studied using a synthetic
example of training a neural network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning, data science, and large-scale computations in general has created an era of computation-
driven inference, applications, and policymaking [1], [2]. Technological solutions, and policies with far-reaching
consequences are increasingly being derived from computational frameworks and data. Multi-agent sociotechnical
systems that are tasked with working collaboratively on such tasks function by interactively sharing data, models,
and results of local computation.
However, when such agents are independent and lack trust, they might not collaborate with or trust the validity
of reported computations of other agents. Quite often, these computations are also expensive and time consuming,
and thus infeasible for recomputation by the doubting peer as a general course of action. In such systems, creating
an environment of trust, accountability, and transparency in the local computations of individual agents promotes
collaborative operation.
For instance, consider training a deep neural network with a given architecture using stochastic gradient descent
(SGD). Here, the model and computations are deterministic given the data used for gradient computation. Appli-
cations are primarily interested in using the trained model represented by the weights of the trained network. But,
if they lack trust in the training agent, they have no simpler way to verify the network than to retrain it. This is
often impractical since the (re)training process consumes extensive amounts of time and tends to require the use
of specialized hardware like GPUs or TPUs. It is thus important to establish trust in the computations involved in
the training phase.
To emphasize the importance of trust in multi-agent systems, let us also consider the case of policy design for
malaria. OpenMalaria (OM) [3] is an open source simulation environment, collaboratively developed to study malaria
epidemiology and the effectiveness of control mechanisms. It is used extensively to design policies to tackle the
disease. Here, individual agencies propose hypotheses regarding the disease and/or intervention policies, and study
them by simulating them under specific environments [4]. Considering the potential impact of such work in designing
disease control policies, it is important to establish accountability and transparency in the process, so as to facilitate
trusted adoption of results. Calls have been made for accountability and transparency in multi-agent computational
systems, especially in high impact fields such as health [5]. A framework for decision provenance helps track the
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2source of results, transparent computational trajectories, and a unified, trusted platform for information sharing. In
fact, the US Centers for Disease Control [6] states that:
public health and scientific advancement are best served when data are released to, or shared with, other
public health agencies, academic researchers, and appropriate private researchers in an open, timely, and
appropriate way. The interests of the public. . . transcends whatever claim scientists may believe they have
to ownership of data acquired or generated using federal funds.
This call implicitly assumes an inherent trust in the shared material. However, there exists significant disparity and
inconsistency in current information-sharing mechanisms that not only hinder access, but also lead to questionable
informational integrity [7]. Here, trust and transparency are critical, but absent in current practice.
Establishing trust in computations translates to guaranteeing correctness of individual steps of the simulation, and
the integrity of the overall computational process leading to the reported results. Importantly, when computational
models and parameters along with intermediate results of individual steps are shared, these steps can be validated
by other agents who can recompute them, thereby validating the entire computation in a distributed manner.
Blockchain is a distributed ledger (database) technology that enables multiple distributed, potentially untrusted
agents to transact and share data in a safe, secure, verifiable and trusted manner through mechanisms providing
transparency, distributed validation, and cryptographic immutability [8]. As such, blockchain is the perfect tool for
establishing the type of trust for complex, long running computations of interest. In this paper we use blockchain
to record, share, and validate frequent audits (model parameters with the intermediate results) of individual steps
of the computation. We describe how blockchain-based distributed validation and shared, immutable storage can
be used and extended to enable efficient trusted verifiable computations.
A common challenge arising in blockchain-based solutions is its scalability. The technology calls for significant
peer-to-peer interaction and local storage of large records that include all the data generated in the network.
These fundamental requirements result in significant communication and storage costs respectively. Thus, using the
technology for large-scale computational processes over a large multi-agent networks is prohibitively expensive.
In this paper, we address this scalability challenge by developing a novel compression schema and a distributed,
parallelizable validation mechanism that is particularly suitable for such large-scale computation contexts.
II. PRIOR WORK
We now provide a brief summary of prior work in related areas.
A variety of applications with widespread impact are being designed with the help of improved computational
capabilities, easier access to data, and machine learning algorithms. Taking the context of malaria, as studied
through OpenMalaria simulations, new pipelines for integrating AI tools and algorithms have been considered [9].
Regression-based methods for better policy search have also been integrated with the open-source platform [10].
Considering the impact of such simulations, researchers have recently raised alarm over their lack of reproduca-
bility. Reproducing results from research papers in AI have been found to be challenging as a significant fraction
of hyperparameters and model considerations are not documented [11]. In another paper focused on reproduction
of results in deep learning [12], the authors explore the possible reasons, and cite variability in evaluation metrics
and reporting among different algorithms and implementations.
Accountability and transparency are being increasingly sought after in large-scale computational platforms, with
particular focus on establishing tractable, consistent computational pipelines. The problem of establishing provenance
in decision-making systems has been considered [13] through the use of an audit mechanism. Distributed learning
in a federated setting with security and privacy limitations has also been considered recently [14].
In fact, the problem of trust in multi-agent computational systems was considered at the beginning of the 20th
century from the viewpoint of reducing errors in complex calculations performed by human workers [15]. Large-
scale computational problems were solved using redundant evaluation of smaller sub-tasks assigned to human
workers, and verified using computational checkpoints. We can draw significant insight into reliable distributed
computing from these practices.
Blockchain systems have brought forth the means for creating distributed trust in peer-to-peer networks for
transactional systems [16]. A variety of applications that invoke interactions and transactions among untrusting
agents have benefited from the trust enabled by blockchains [17]–[19]. More recently, blockchains have been used
in creating secure, distributed, data sharing pipelines in healthcare [20] and genomics [21]. This trust can also be
leveraged in creating trusted distributed computing systems, as highlighted in this paper.
3III. MOTIVATION
The motivation behind studying the problem of trust in multi-agent computational systems is best understood
through the practical example of OpenMalaria. Agencies making policy decisions gain access to research findings
such as transmission models from the work of independent organizations studying malaria around the world. The
open source nature of the platform has facilitated widespread access, and has created a large-scale collaborative
effort toward tackling the disease. The studies performed by various agents lead to policies that determine the
health and well-being of vast sections of the community. Sharing data, models, and outcomes of simulation studies
thus requires accountability and transparency with the guarantee of computational integrity, enabling the creation
of reliable distributed computing platforms.
Let us consider a simple experiment that a malaria data scientist (MDS) is interested in conducting, to study the
disease spread and control under a specific environment characterized by factors such as demographics, entomology,
and intervention strategies in place. In particular, the MDS wishes to evaluate intervention strategies, such as
distributing insecticide treated nets (ITN) and commissioning indoor residual spraying (IRS). The simulation is
used to evaluate the efficiency of the policies, in terms of quantities such as disability adjusted life years (DALY)
which quantifies the total life years lost from malaria-related fatality. Each policy also incurs a related cost of
implementation, such as healthcare system costs (HSC) and intervention costs (IC).
By studying the cost-benefit tradeoffs, the data scientist and/or other agencies can design optimal policies. Such
agencies have access to simulation results performed by independent agents/workers. However, malicious agents,
such as one who manufactures ITNs, could generate spurious results that address vested interests, rather than
providing accurate insight into the disease. At the same time, workers with insufficient computational resources
might also generate errors in the simulation process, potentially generating wrong inferences about the disease and
policies.
Adoption of such results for policy design requires inter-agent trust, which is not guaranteed in multi-agent sys-
tems. Repeating experiments for each adoption is prohibitively expensive. Trust in computations would significantly
assist information sharing.
The notion of trust has been considered from a variety of standpoints [22] and has contextually varied definitions
as considered in depth in [23]. A qualitative definition of trust in multi-agent computational systems can be adapted
from [24], [25] as:
Trust is the belief an agent has that the other party will execute an agreed upon sequence of actions and
reports an accurate representation of computed result (being honest and reliable).
We provide a more specific characterization of trust. Such computations in general are composed of a sequence of
atomic operations that update a system state iteratively. For instance, this could be OM simulations tracking the
progression of malaria in a certain community, or the weights of a neural network as updated iteratively by a training
algorithm. Establishing distributed trust, as defined, for such computations in a universal sense (without contextual
understanding of computation specifics) requires checking consistency of individual steps of the simulation by
recomputation. In particular, we decompose trust into two main components:
• Validation: The individual atomic computations of the simulation are guaranteed and accepted to be correct.
• Verfication: The integrity of the overall simulation process can be checked by other agents in the system.
The two elements respectively ensure local consistency of computation and post-hoc corroboration of audits. Their
mathematical characterization is provided in Sec. IV.
A naive solution is to validate each step (iteration) of the process using independent recomputation by validating
agents. Similarly, the integrity of the computational process can be verified from an immutable record of validated
intermediate states. However, practical simulations are long and involve a large number of iterations. Validation
requires communication of the iterates to the endorsers, and recording the validated state on the immutable data
structure. This results in significant communication and storage overhead if every state is reported and stored as is,
in addition to the computational cost of validation, preventing its adoption to large-scale systems and computational
methods.
It is thus important to utilize the underlying structure of the simulation to reduce these overheads. This can be
done by reporting a compressed version of the states with sufficient detail such that they can be validated to within
a desired tolerance. We use universal compressors to reduce these communication and storage costs. Each block of
communication and storage also incurs the overhead corresponding to headers and metadata. It is thus prudent to
4combine multiple iterates into a single frame before compression, and collectively validate and store frames of the
computational process.
Blockchain systems establish trust in transactional systems for peer-to-peer networks of agents through distributed
endorsements, consensus on transactional validity, and the storage of the collection of all transactions in the network
in a shared, append-only, immutable, distributed ledger at each peer in the network. We leverage these features
directly (1) to use blockchain transactions to record steps of the computation, and (2) to facilitate the immutable
storage of validated audits.
Allowing validation and verification of computations not only creates an environment of trust among agents,
but also enforces a higher degree of conformation and consistency in experiments. Necessitating validation and
verification also implies a shared common mechanism for model and data sharing, enabling scientific reproducibility.
The setup also facilitates well-defined processes for distributed and derived computing, wherein the former involves
a computational framework performed piecewise at multiple nodes, and the latter concerns deriving new experiments
using checkpoints drawn from the intermediate audits of prior computational experiments.
IV. COMPUTATION AND TRUST MODEL
Let us now mathematically formalize the computation model, and validation and verification requirements under
consideration. We consider an iterative computational algorithm in this paper.
Consider a computational process that updates a system state, Xt ∈ Rd, over iterations t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, depending
on the current state and an external source of randomness θt ∈ Rd′ , according to an atomic operation f : Rd×Rd′ →
Rd as follows
Xt+1 = f(Xt, θt). (1)
For simplicity we assume that θt is shared by all agents. This can easily be generalized as elaborated later. We
also assume that the function f(·) is L-Lipschitz continuous in the system state, without loss of generality, under
the Euclidean norm, for all θ ∈ Rd′ i.e.,
‖f(X1, θ)− f(X2, θ)‖ ≤ L ‖X1 −X2‖ . (2)
That is, minor modifications to the inputs of the atomic operation result in correspondingly bounded variation in the
outputs. This is expected for instance in simulations of physical or biological processes, as seen in epidemiological
and meteorological simulations, as most physical systems governing behavior in nature are smooth. For instance,
with respect to the OpenMalaria example, the requirement implies that minor changes in policies result in minor
changes in outcomes.
We consider a multi-agent system where one agent, referred to as the computing client (client in short), runs the
computational algorithm. The other agents in the system, called peers, are aware of the atomic operation f(·) and
share the same external randomness and hence can recompute the iterations. Validation of intermediate states is
performed by independent peers referred to as endorsers through an iterative recomputation of the reported states
from the the most recent validated state using the atomic operation f(·). The process of validation is referred to
as an endorsement of the state. A reported state, X˜t is valid if it lies within a margin, ∆val, of the state Xˆt as
recomputed by the endorser, i.e., ∥∥∥X˜t − Xˆt∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥X˜t − f(X˜t−1)∥∥∥ ≤ ∆val. (3)
The validation criterion (3), without loss of generality, associates equal weightage to each component of the state,
and can be easily generalized to weighted norms or other notions of distance.
Verification concerns checking for integrity of the computational process which is enabled through the storage of
frequent audits of validated states. Thus, if the audits record the states
{
Y˜1, Y˜2, . . .
}
, then verification corresponds
to ensuring that the recomputed version, Yˆt, of the state is within a margin, ∆ver, of the recorded version, i.e.,∥∥∥Yˆt − Y˜t∥∥∥ ≤ ∆ver. (4)
Without loss of generality, validation requirements are stricter than for verification, i.e., ∆val ≥ ∆ver. We now
construct the system to address these two trust requirements.
5Fig. 1. Functional categorization of peer-to-peer network: Clients run the iterative algorithm; multiple independent frames are validated in
parallel by non-overlapping subsets of endorsers; orderers check consistency and append valid frames to the blockchain.
V. MULTI-AGENT BLOCKCHAIN FRAMEWORK
We elaborate the system design, starting with the functional categorization of the network. We then elaborate each
functional unit, including the compression at the client, the validation by endorsers, and the role of orderers in adding
blocks to the ledger. For ease, let us consider a deterministic iterative algorithm for computation, Xt+1 = f(Xt).
A. Peer-to-Peer Network—Functional Decomposition
The peer-to-peer network is functionally categorized into clients, endorsers, and orderers, who function together
in computing, validating, ordering, and storing the simulated states on the blockchain ledger. Their functioning is
as follows:
1) The client runs the computations and iteratively computes the states Xt, for t ≥ 1.
2) The client groups a sequence of states into a frame, compresses, and communicates the frame to a set of
endorsers.
3) The endorsers decompress frames, validate states by recomputing them iteratively, and report endorsements
to orderers.
4) The orderers subsample and add the frame to the blockchain if it has been validated, and if all prior frames
have been validated and added to the ledger.
5) The peers update their copy of the ledger.
This is depicted in Fig. 1. The classification is only based on function and each peer can perform different functions
across time. Since states are grouped into independent frames, they can be validated by non-overlapping subsets of
endorsers in parallel.
B. Client Operations
Clients performs the computations, compute the states, construct frames of iterates, compress, and report them
to endorsers. We assume there exists an endorser assignment policy.
Owing to the Lipschitz continuity,
‖Xt+1 −Xt‖ ≤ L ‖Xt −Xt−1‖ .
Thus state updates (differences) across iterates are bounded to within a factor of the deviation in the previous
iteration. This property can be leveraged to compress state updates using delta encoding [26], where states are
6Fig. 2. Structure of frames: Each frame includes a header followed by compressed updates of successive iterates.
Fig. 3. Operations performed by the client within a frame. The client computes the states according to the iterative algorithm, performs
delta encoding, and communicates the compressed state updates to the endorsers in frames.
represented in the form of differences from the previous state. Then, it suffices to store the state at certain checkpoints
of the computational process, with the iterates between checkpoints represented by the updates.
We describe the construction inductively, starting with the initial state X0, assumed to be the first checkpoint.
Let us assume that the state reported at time t is X˜t and the true state is Xt. Then, if Xt+1 = f(Xt), define the
update as
∆Xt+1 = Xt+1 − X˜t.
The cost of communication (for validation) and storage (for verification) of these updates is reduced by performing
lossy compression (vector quantization [27]). Let the quantizer be represented by Q(·) and let the maximum
quantization error magnitude be , i.e., if the client reports ∆˜Xt = Q(∆Xt), then,∥∥∥∆˜Xt −∆Xt∥∥∥ ≤ . (5)
Additionally, the checkpoints can also be compressed using a Lempel-Ziv-like dictionary-based lossy compressor.
Here, a dictionary of unique checkpoints are maintained. For each new checkpoint, we first check if the state is
within a margin  from an entry in the dictionary, and the index of this entry is reported. If not, the state is added
to the dictionary and its index is reported. Other universal vector quantizers can also be utilized for compressing
checkpoints, and we denote this quantizer by Q˜(·).
Let ∆quant be the maximum magnitude of a state update within a frame, i.e., if ‖∆Xt‖ > ∆quant, the client creates
a checkpoint at t+ 1 and reports X˜t+1 = Q˜(Xt+1). Then Xt+1 is reported as
X˜t+1 =
{
Q˜(Xt+1) , if t+ 1 is a checkpoint
X˜t + ∆˜Xt+1 , o/w
. (6)
The resulting sequence of frames is as shown in Fig. 2.
Separate from creating new checkpoints adaptively, the system can also restrict the maximum size of a frame by
a constant M¯ to limit the computational overhead of its validation. Fig. 3 summarizes the tasks performed by the
computing client.
The choice of design parameters, ,∆quant, are to be made such that the reports are accurate enough for validation.
The optimal design choice is shown in the following results.
Theorem 1: If f(·) is L-Lipschitz continuous, and  ≤ ∆valL+1 , then, a state X˜t is invalidated by an honest endorser
only if there is a computational error of magnitude at least , i.e.,
∥∥∥X˜t −Xt∥∥∥ ≥ .
7Proof: Let us assume that X˜t is a valid state. Then,∥∥∥Xˆt+1 − X˜t+1∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥Xˆt+1 −Xt+1∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥Xt+1 − X˜t+1∥∥∥
≤ L
∥∥∥X˜t −Xt∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥∆˜Xt −∆Xt∥∥∥ (7)
≤ L
∥∥∥∆˜Xt−1 −∆Xt−1∥∥∥+  (8)
≤ (L+ 1) ≤ ∆val, (9)
where (7) follows from the Lipschitz continuity of the atomic operation, (8) is from the definition of the compressed
state updates, and (9) follows from the quantization error bound.
Corollary 1: If
∥∥∥X˜t −Xt∥∥∥ ≥ ∆val + L, then X˜t is invalidated.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for invalidation in Thm. 1 and Cor. 1 highlight the fact that computational
errors of magnitude less than  are missed, and any error of magnitude at least ∆val + L is certainly detected.
When the approximation error is made arbitrarily small, all errors beyond the tolerance are detected. A variety
of vector quantizers, satisfying Thm. 1 can be used for lossy delta encoding—one simple choice is lattice vector
quantizers [28].
Theorem 2: Let B(∆quant) =
{
x ∈ Rd : ‖x‖ ≤ ∆quant
}
and let ∆Xt ∼ Unif(B(∆quant)), then the communication
and storage cost per state update is O
(
d log
(
∆quant

))
bits.
This follows directly from the covering number of B(∆quant) using B() balls; a similar cost is incurred for other
standard lattices.
Theorem 3: For any frame n, with checkpoint at Tn, maximum number of states in the frame, Mn, is bounded
as
Mn ≥ min
{
log (∆quant − )− log δn
logL
, M¯
}
, (10)
where δn = ‖XTn+1 −XTn‖, is the first update in the frame.
Proof: Without loss of generality, let us consider the first frame, i.e., n = 1, Tn = 0. Then, Mn = t implies
that
∆quant ≤ ‖∆Xt‖ =
∥∥∥Xt+1 − X˜t∥∥∥
≤ ‖Xt+1 −Xt‖+
∥∥∥Xt − X˜t∥∥∥ (11)
≤ Lt ‖X1 −X0‖+  = Ltδ1 + , (12)
where (11) follows from the triangle inequality, and (12) follows from the Lipschitz continuity and the quantization
error. Thus the result follows, for any frame, by direct extension.
This provides a simple sufficient condition on the size of a frame, in terms of the magnitude of the first iteration in
the frame. Naturally a small first iterate implies the possibility of accommodating more iterates in the frame. This
lower bound can be used in identifying the typical frame size and the corresponding costs of communication and
computation involved, prior to the design of the scheme. We describe the generalization of the compressor to the
parameter unaware setting in Sec. VII.
C. Endorser and Orderer Operations
We now define the role of an endorser in validating a frame. A summary of the operations is depicted in Fig. 4.
For preliminary analysis, we assume that endorsers are honest and are homogeneous in terms of communication
latency and computational capacity. A more refined allocation policy can be designed to account for the case of
variabilities in communication and computational costs. However we do not consider this in this paper.
Each endorser involved in validating a frame, sequentially checks the state updates by recomputing from the
last valid state, i.e., to validate the report X˜t+1, the endorser computes Xˆt+1 = f(X˜t) and checks for the validity
criterion (3). The frame is reported as valid if all updates are valid in the frame. The endorsements are then reported
to the orderer.
8Fig. 4. Operations performed by the endorser for a single frame: The endorser sequentially validates the states reported by the client by
decoding the updates and recomputing the state from the atomic operation.
Fig. 5. Operations performed by the orderer for frames. The orderer sequentially adds valid frames to the blockchain after checking for
consistency.
Individual update validations can also be performed in parallel and finally verified for sequential consistency.
Such parallelism can be performed either at the individual endorser-level, or in the form of the distribution of the
sub-frames across endorsers. This results in a reduction of the time required for validating a frame. For the sake
of simplicity, we skip these extensions in this paper.
Upon receiving the endorsements for frames, the orderer checks for consistency of the checkpoints and adds a
valid frame to the blockchain ledger if all prior frames have already been added, and broadcasts the block to other
peers. This is depicted in Fig. 5.
Since the state updates are stored on the immutable data structure of the blockchain, they provide an avenue for
verification of the computations at a later stage. As described in (4), the verification requirements are not as strict
as the validation requirements. Thus it suffices to subsample the updates in a frame and store only a subset, i.e.,
one state is stored for every K = ∆ver∆val iterates. Then, the effective state update is the sum of the individual updates
of the K intermediate iterates.
A block stored on the blockchain is now characterized by the audits that are either the checkpoints or the
cumulative updates corresponding to K successive iterates. The audits Y˜τ are then defined by
Y˜τ+1 =
{
Y˜τ +
∑
∆˜Xt+1 , if no checkpoint in next K iterates
X˜t′ , otherwise
, (13)
where the sum is over the intermediate iterates, and t′ is the next checkpoint. Then, the audits are grouped into
blocks as described by Fig. 2 and added to the blockchain ledger by the orderer.
9Theorem 4: For subsampled storage at a frequency 1/K according to (13), a Lipschitz constant L of f(·), and
quantization error , ∥∥∥Yˆτ+1 − Y˜τ+1∥∥∥ ≤ (LK + 1)K, (14)
where Yˆτ+1 = fK(Y˜τ ).
Proof: First, fK(·) is LK-Lipschitz continuous. Then,∥∥∥Yˆτ+1 − Y˜τ+1∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥fK(Y˜τ )− fK(Yτ )∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥Yτ+1 − Y˜τ+1∥∥∥ (15)
≤ LK
∥∥∥Y˜τ − Yτ∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥∑
t∈Tτ
(
∆˜Xt −∆Xt
)∥∥∥∥∥ (16)
≤ (LK + 1)K,
where (15) follows from the triangle inequality, and (16) follows from the Lipschitz inequality and (13).
Thus, a viable subsampling frequency can be determined by finding a K such that (LK +1)K ≤ ∆ver . This reduces
the storage cost on the blockchain at the expense of accuracy of recorded audits. If the agents are interested in
increasing accuracy of the records over time, then the quantizers can be dynamically adjusted accordingly.
D. Example Application
Let us now elaborate the design from the context of a synthetic example that is used later for experimental study
in Sec. VIII. Consider an agent, the client, in a network who wishes to address a simple classification problem
using training data that he has access to. The client aims to train a neural network using backpropagtion based on
mini batch stochastic gradient descent (SGD) to solve this classification problem and subsequently share the trained
network with other agents who are also interested in the solution.
However, the client is limited by the amount of computational resources available for training, and also does not
wish to share the private data used for training. Since it has limited resources toward gradient computation, it uses
small batch sizes to get faster estimates. However, the peers do not trust the computations performed by the client,
not just because of its proclivity toward errors arising from computational limitations, but also possible malicious
intent. The peers themselves have access to private datasets, drawn from the same source, but much smaller in size
such that they can not train a network on their own for the task.
In such a context, we can establish distributed trust in the agents using MBF as follows:
1) The client sets up the training with parametric inputs (network architecture, learning rates, batch sizes etc.)
and shares them over the blockchain with other peers.
2) The client runs the training algorithm, compresses state updates (network weights) using lossy compression
and reports compressed frames to endorsers for validation.
3) The endorsers rerun steps of mini batch SGD from validated prior reports. They compute deviation (Fig. 4)
in network weights, endorse according to (3), and communicate validated frames and endorsements to the
orderer.
4) MBF orderer checks for consensus among endorsers and subsamples the frame to construct blocks. They then
add blocks sequentially to the blockchain ledger.
5) Client reports the network to peers at the end of training.
Since the experiment is run on the MBF platform, peers are assured of validity of steps of the training, and also
have access to the blockchain to verify the computations. Since the private training data is not shared across peers,
the endorsement process for revalidation needs to be appropriately adjusted. This is described in Sec. VII, and a
detailed experimental study of this problem, adapted to the MNIST dataset, is done in Sec. VIII.
Thus the MBF platform addresses the trust issues described in Sec. III and allows for efficient collaboration and
trusted data, model, and result sharing among agencies involved in malaria research and policy design.
VI. DESIGN ADVANTAGES AND COSTS
We now perform a cost-benefit analysis of the design. To the best of our knowledge this is the first system
designed to address trust in such systems and so we benchmark the costs against simpler implementations to
emphasize the importance of the different components of the system.
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Let us first identify the advantages of the platform.
• Accountability: The MBF platform guarantees provenance through the immutable record of computations.
Thus, we can not only detect the source of potential conflicts, but also to trace ownership of computations.
• Transparency: The platform establishes trust among agents through a transparent record of the validated
computational trajectories of computation.
• Adaptivity: The frame design, endorsement, and validation methods adapt according to the state evolution.
Further, the validity margins can be altered across time by dynamically varying the quantizers. In convergent
simulations/algorithms, the system can thus use monotonically decreasing margins to obtain stricter guarantees
at convergence.
• Generality: The platform uses fairly general building blocks, and can be easily implemented using existing
methods.
• Computation universality: The design is agnostic to computational process specifics and can be implemented
as long as it is composed of reproducible atomic computations.
• Scientific reproducibility: By storing intermediate states this platform guarantees reliable data and model
sharing, and collaborative research. It thus facilitates scientific reproducibility in large-scale computational
experiments.
To compare the costs of the system, let us consider three different modes for such blockchain-based distributed
trust:
1) Transaction Mode: Here we treat each iteration as a transaction and validate and store each state transition
as a block on the blockchain ledger independently.
2) Streaming Mode: Here each state is independently compressed according to a universal compressor, validated,
and stored on the blockchain.
3) Batch Mode: This corresponds to the MBF design described in this paper.
Let us assume that the average number of endorsers per frame be E¯, the average size of the frame be M¯ , and
the subsampling frequency be ν = 1/K in the batch mode. We benchmark costs relative to this average set of M¯
iterations, and the same computational redundancy.
First, let us consider the computational overhead involved. Each mode performs (1 +E)-times as many compu-
tations as the untrusted simulation. The streaming and batch modes additionally incur the cost of compression and
decompression of states. The batch mode also includes the cost of subsampling the frames. Thus we can see that
the transaction mode incurs the least computational overhead, while the batch mode incurs the most. Informally,
the batch mode incurs a cost of
C
(comp.)
batch = (1 + E)C
(comp.)
sim + C
(comp.)
compression + C
(comp.)
sampling, (17)
where C(comp.)sim , C
(comp.)
compression, C
(comp.)
sampling are the computational costs of the simulation, compression and decompression,
and subsampling respectively. The transaction and streaming modes incur just the first and the first two costs
respectively.
The communication overheads include the state reports and metadata used for validation and coordination
respectively. In the transaction mode, as states are uncompressed, the communication cost is significant and is not
scalable. On the other hand, the streaming and batch modes reduce these costs through lossy compression. Assuming
a bounded set of states, X , such that maxX∈X ‖X‖ = B  ∆quant, the worst-case sufficient communication cost
in transaction mode using vector quantization for M¯ iterations is
C
(comm.)
transaction = O
(
M¯d log2
(
B

)
+ M¯C
(comm.)
meta
)
, (18)
where C(comm.)meta is the average communication cost of metadata, per instance of communication. On the other hand,
the batch mode reduces both compression cost, and the metadata, as
C
(comm.)
batch = O
(
M¯d log2
(
∆quant

)
+ d log2
(
B

)
+ C
(comm.)
meta
)
. (19)
The costs expressed are sufficient costs in the order sense and more precise estimates can be computed given the
compression scheme and statistics of state evolution.
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Similarly, with regard to storage, the transaction mode incurs significant costs on account of not compressing
the audits. The batch mode not only incurs lesser metadata for storage but also fewer state updates on account
of subsampling when compared to the streaming mode. To be precise, C(storage)transaction = C
(comm.)
transaction in the order sense,
whereas
C
(storage)
batch = O
(
νM¯d log2
(
∆quant

)
+ d log2
(
B

)
+ C
(storage)
meta
)
. (20)
Thus the batch mode reduces communication and storage overheads at the expense of added computational
cost. Through a careful analysis of the tradeoffs, we can adopt optimal compression schemes and subsampling
mechanisms.
VII. EXTENSIONS OF DESIGN
We now describe a couple of avenues for generalization.
A. Parameter Agnostic Design
In Sec.V we used a vector quantizers based on the Lipschitz constant L. In practice, such parameters of the
computational algorithm are not known apriori. Underestimating L can result in using a larger quantization error,
that could cause errors in validation even when the client computes correctly. In such cases, it is essential to be
able to identify the cause for the error.
One option is to estimate L from computed samples. This translates to estimating the maximum gradient
magnitude for the atomic operation which might be expensive in sample and computational complexity, depending
on the application. Thus, we propose an alternative compression scheme.
We draw insight from video compression strategies, and propose the use of successive refinement coding [29] of
the state updates. That is, a compression bit stream is generated for each state update such that the accuracy can
be improved by sending additional bits from the bit stream. Successive refinement allows the endorsers to provide
updates on the report such that the state accuracy can be iteratively improved.
Thus, if an invalidation notice is received from endorsers, the client has two options—checking the computations,
and/or refining the reported state through successive refinement. Depending on the computation-communication cost
tradeoff, the client appropriately chooses the more economical alternative. Through successive refinement, the client
provides more accurate descriptions of the state vector, and thus reduces the possibility of validation errors caused
by report inaccuracy.
One possible efficient compression technique uses lattice vector quantizers [30], [31] to define successive refine-
ment codes. This also reduces the size of the codebook, if the refinement lattices are assumed to be of the same
geometry, because the client only needs to communicate the scaling corresponding to the refinement. This allows
for improved adaptability in the refinement updates. More efficient quantizers can also be defined if additional
information regarding the application and state updates are available.
B. Computations with External Randomness
As described in Sec. IV, such computational algorithms in practice typically evolve iteratively as a function of
the current state Xt, and an external randomness θt. When this randomness is not shared across agents, and is
inaccessible to the client, reproduction of the reported results by an endorser becomes infeasible and so is validating
local computations. This could also emerge in cases where the client is unwilling to share private data associated
used by the algorithm with other agents [14].
For instance, in simulations of disease spread using black box models, each run of the simulation adopts a different
outcome, depending on the underlying random elements introduced by the model to mimic societal and pathological
disease spread factors. Quite often, the client does not have access to all the random elements introduced by the
model in creating that particular outcome.
Whereas the exact random instance might not be available, the source of such randomness is often common,
i.e., θt ∼ Pθ, and Pθ is known. In this context, we redefine validation as guaranteeing (3) with probability at least
1− ρ, i.e.,
P
[∥∥∥X˜t − Xˆt∥∥∥ ≥ ∆marg] ≤ ρ. (21)
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This requirement removes outliers in the computation process and only allows trajectories close to the expected
behavior.
Then, we can exploit the law of large numbers to validate reports by their deviation from the average behavior
observed across multiple independent endorsers,
Xˆt+1 =
1
m
m∑
i=1
f(X˜t, θi),
where θi
i.i.d.∼ Pθ. By choosing a sufficiently large number of endorsers, depending on ρ, we can assure (21). The
role of the endorsers is appropriately modified and the system calls for higher coordination amongst the endorsers.
Using multi-variate concentration inequalities, we can also quantify the sufficient number of endorsers for
validation.
Theorem 5: Let  < ∆margL+1 . For a state at time t, if the average of m endorsers is used for validation,
P
[∥∥∥X˜t − Xˆt∥∥∥ ≥ ∆marg] ≤ 2dλ˜2
(∆marg − (L+ 1))2
(
1 +
1
mλ˜
)2
, (22)
where λ˜ is the maximum eigenvalue of covariance matrix of of the quantized state vector.
Proof: For a d-dimensional random variable X with E [X] = µ,E
[
(X − µ)(X − µ)T ] = V , according to the
multidimensional Chebyshev inequality [32],
P [‖X − µ‖V −1 > t] ≤
d
t2
.
Then, using the fact that λmin ‖x‖ ≤ ‖x‖A ≤ λmax ‖x‖, for any vector x and matrix A with minimum and
maximum eigenvalues λmin, λmax, we have
P [‖X − µ‖ > t] ≤ λ
2d
t2
, (23)
where λ is the maximum eigenvalue of V .
Further, from the bound on the quantization error, we can observe that for X˜t+1 = Xt+1 +Zt, where Zt ∈ B().
Then, ∥∥∥E [Xt+1]− E [X˜t+1]∥∥∥ ≤ .
Then, ∥∥∥E [X˜t+1]− E [Xˆt+1]∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥E [X˜t+1]− E [f(X˜t, θ)]∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥E [Xt+1]− E [X˜t+1]∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥E [f(Xt, θ − f(X˜t, θ)]∥∥∥ (24)
≤ + L
∥∥∥E [Xt]− E [X˜t]∥∥∥ (25)
≤ (L+ 1), (26)
where (24) follows from the triangle inequality, and (25) follows from the bound on the quantization error, the fact
that E [‖X‖] ≥ ‖E [X]‖, and the Lipschitz continuity.
Finally, for any α ∈ (0, 1),
P
[∥∥∥X˜t+1 − Xˆt+1∥∥∥ ≥ ∆marg]
≤ P
[∥∥∥X˜t+1 − E [X˜t+1]∥∥∥ ≥ α(∆marg − (L+ 1))]
+ P
[∥∥∥Xˆt+1 − E [Xˆt+1]∥∥∥ ≥ (1− α)(∆marg − (L+ 1))] (27)
≤ d
(∆marg − (L+ 1))2
(
λ˜2
α2
+
1
m2(1− α)2
)
(28)
≤ 2dλ˜
2
(∆marg − (L+ 1))2
(
1 +
1
mλ˜
)2
, (29)
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where (27) follows from the triangle inequality and the union bound, and (26), and (28) from (23). Finally, (29) is
obtained by maximizing the bound over α ∈ (0, 1).
Corollary 2: To guarantee validation with probability at least 1 − ρ, for a margin of deviation of ∆marg, where
ρ ≤ 2d(∆marg−(L+1))2 , it suffices to use
m ≥
[(√
ρ
2d(∆marg − (L+ 1))− λ˜
)]−1
(30)
endorsers.
This sufficient condition follows directly from Thm. 5.
VIII. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we run some simple synthetic experiments using the MNIST database [33], for the scenario
described in Sec. V-D, to understand the distributed trust environment design, the costs involved, and the benefits
of the enforcement. These synthetic experiments were selected to evaluate the efficacy of our approach with a
domain that is familiar, and the process of training neural networks that is common in the research community.
Let us consider a simple 3-layer neural network, trained on the MNIST database, with 25 neurons in the hidden
layer. Consider a client training the neural network using mini-batch stochastic gradient descent (SGD), with limited
resources such that, it is constrained in computing gradients and so uses a small batchsize of 10 samples per iteration
and 1000 iterations. The average precision of such a neural network trained with gradient descent is 97.4%. We now
wish to establish trust in the training process owing to the limited resources of the client. Whereas this configuration
is far from the state of the art on the database, it does help understand the trust environment better owing to its
suboptimality.
Since the training process uses stochastic gradients, exact recomputation of the iterates is infeasible. Hence, we
compare deviations from the average across m = 5 endorsers per state for validation. We evaluate the computation
and communication cost of validation as a function of the tolerance chosen for validation. Since the neural network
converges to a local minimum according to SGD, we use a tolerance for iteration t as ∆val(t) = ∆maxlog(t+1) . That is,
the validation requirements are made stronger with the iterations.
We consider three main cases of the simulation:
1) Base case: Compression error is less than validation tolerance, i.e.,  ≤ ∆max, and maximum frame size is
10% of the total number of iterations.
2) Coarse compression: Large compression error, i.e.,  ≥ ∆max for at least some instances, and same base M¯ .
3) Large frames: Same base compression error, and maximum frame size is 20% of total number of iterations.
In the base case, invalidation from approximation errors are more frequent in later iterations when the tolerance
is also lower. However, with increasing iterations, the network weights are also closer to the minima. Thus
approximation errors can be eliminated by successive refinement, as gradients estimates by the client also get
more accurate. The presence of outliers and smaller batch sizes impact the initial iterations much more, which are
reported with comparatively better accuracy, as required by the weaker validation criterion, therein only invalidating
computational errors.
In comparison, in the case of coarse compression, approximation errors of the gradients are much more likely,
therein resulting in more instances of invalidation. This translates to a higher number of gradient recomputations at
the expense of reduced communication overhead on the compressed state updates. On the other hand, in the case of
the extremely large frames, the endorsers validate longer sequences of states at once. Thus, each invalidation results
in a recomputation of all succeeding states, therein increasing the number of recomputations from the base case.
This case however reduces the number of frames and checkpoints, therein reducing the average communication
cost in comparison to the base case.
In Fig. 6, the average number of gradient recomputations per iteration is shown for these three cases. As expected,
this decays sharply as we increase the tolerance. Note that at either extreme, the three cases converge in the number
of recomputations. This is owing to the fact that at one end all gradients are accepted whereas at the stricter
end, most gradients are rejected with high probability, irrespective of the compression parameters. In the moderate
tolerance range, we observe the tradeoffs as explained above. The corresponding communication cost tradeoff is
shown in Fig. 7.
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Fig. 6. Average recomputation cost tradeoff: Plot depicts the average number of recomputations of gradients per iteration for varying
validation requirements.
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Fig. 7. Average communication cost tradeoff: Plot depicts the average number of bits per dimension communicated by clients to endorsers
for varying validation tolerance.
Fig. 8 shows the precision of the neural network trained under the validation requirement as compared against the
networks trained with standard mini batch SGD of batch sizes 10, 30, and 50. We note that the network trained with
trust outperforms the case of vanilla SGD with the same batch size as it eliminates spurious gradients at validation.
Increasing trust requirements (decreasing tolerance) results in improved precision of the model. In particular, it is
worth noting that the strictest validation criterion results in performance that is almost as good as training with
a batch size of 50. This is understandable as the endorsers validate only those gradients that are close to that of
the case with mini batch of size 50. In fact, even when the trust requirements are fairly relaxed, just eliminating
outliers in the gradients enhances the training significantly.
Thus, these simple experiments not only highlights the role of trust in guaranteeing local and global consistency
in the computational process, but also the cost tradeoffs involved in establishing them. For this application for
instance, appropriate parameters can be chosen by studying the precision-cost tradeoffs. Other applications might
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Fig. 8. Precision of NN vs Trust: Plot depicts precision of the trained neural network satisfying the local validation criterion. Eliminating
spurious gradients through validation enhances training process.
invoke similar tradeoffs, implicit or explicit, in the trust guarantees and the resulting cost of implementation.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper we considered a multi-agent computational platform and the problem of establishing trust in the
computations performed by individual agents in such a system. Using a novel combination of blockchains and
distributed consensus through recomputation, we assured validity of local computations and simple verification of
computational trajectories. Using efficient, universal compression techniques, we also identified methods to reduce
the communication and storage overheads concerned with establishing trust in such systems, therein addressing the
scalability challenge posed by blockchain systems.
Creation of such trusted platforms for distributed computation among untrusting agents allows for improved
collaboration, and efficient data, model, and result sharing that is critical to establish efficient policy design
mechanisms. Additionally they also result in creating unified platforms for sharing results, and in ensuring scientific
reproducibility.
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